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‘[…] the optimistic view – which seems to be at the heart of much meta-
physical rationalism – [holds] that all good things must be compatible, and 
that therefore freedom, order, knowledge, happiness, a closed future […] must 
be at least compatible, and perhaps even entail one another in a systematic 
fashion. But this proposition is not self-evidently true, if only on empirical 
grounds. Indeed, it is perhaps one of the least plausible beliefs ever entertained 
by profound and influential thinkers.’ 
Isaiah Berlin (2000: 117-118) 
1. Introduction
It has become increasingly popular to criticize political theories from the 
perspective of the metaphysical debate on free will. Smilansky (1997) was 
one of the first to approach egalitarianism from this angle, and argued that 
the viability of different egalitarian theories is dependent on our solution 
to the free will problem, that is, the kinds of egalitarianism that are admis-
sible depend strongly on the conception of free will they presuppose. 
Following up on this endeavor with a more specific claim, Van der 
Deijl (2013) has used metaphysical arguments to criticize luck egalitari-
anism. Luck egalitarianism and its variations, a popular group of positions 
developed among others by Dworkin (2002), suggest that individuals 
should be compensated for negative effects due to those factors for which 
they have no responsibility. This compensation should be paid for at the 
expense of positive effects for which they were not responsible. Luck egali-
tarianism therefore requires a notion of responsibility that can separate 
factors for which we are responsible from factors for which we are not: it 
must separate luck from merit. Hard determinists cannot offer such an 
account, because they see actions as necessarily following from physical 
states; compatibilists have tried, but according to Van der Deijl to no avail. 
An adequate notion of responsibility can be held by libertarians, but that 
position is unpopular because it requires the rejection of determinism. Van 
der Deijl concludes that, unless libertarianism can save the day after all, 
luck egalitarianism cannot distinguish luck from merit. In that case luck 
egalitarianism would collapse into outcome egalitarianism. 
Supporting the arguments of Smilansky and Van der Deijl is the 
silent premise that metaphysical theory takes precedence over political 
theory, in the sense that a political theory should presuppose a plausible 
metaphysical theory. Kang has called this silent premise the ‘Posteriority 
Thesis’ (2003). 
The Posteriority Thesis (PT) is intuitively appealing: it seems obvious 
that a political theory should not incorporate entities that cannot exist 
metaphysically. The consequences of accepting this thesis are, however, 
not nearly as intuitive since acceptance of PT forces us to dismiss notions 
that have not only proven to be useful in political philosophy, but that also 
seem to be morally significant. It also risks paralyzing political philosophy 
until certain metaphysical issues have been resolved. Although none of 
these points are in themselves sufficient reason to discard PT, they are rea-
son enough to inquire into its foundation.
This paper subjects PT to a critical evaluation. Its main aim is to show 
that the truth of PT is often assumed to be trivial, while it has important 
consequences and while there are alternative approaches to political theory 
that can do without it. I will proceed by assessing whether it is correct 
to dismiss a political theory on the grounds of not being consistent with 
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plausible metaphysical theories about free will, as Smilansky and Van der 
Deijl have done. It should be added that it is explicitly not my intention 
to confirm or reject PT, nor to defend or reject any of the political theories 
discussed by Van der Deijl or Smilansky on non-metaphysical grounds. I 
merely wish to show that the influence of metaphysics in political theory 
is not necessarily as decisive as is sometimes thought. 
The next section will introduce PT. The argument will then consist 
of three parts. Section 2 shows that PT is usually assumed rather than 
justified, and argues that PT has undesirable consequences. Section 3 
shows that it is possible to do political philosophy without adopting PT, 
using the example of John Rawls. This example illustrates that metaphy-
sical theories carry less, if any force for political theory if one takes moral 
beliefs as one’s starting point. 
2. Introducing the Posteriority Thesis
This section aims to clarify the notion of the Posteriority Thesis, and 
explains why it is important to subject it to scrutiny. The term ‘Posteriority 
Thesis’ was coined by Sung-Hak Kang (2003) in response to Smilansky 
(1997). Smilansky discussed egalitarianism as defended by Cohen. Cohen 
had argued that he could introduce his views on political theory without 
trespassing into the notoriously complicated free will debate. These are 
some of Smilansky’s arguments: 
‘(i) Firstly, we cannot accept the assumption that people obviously and 
uncontentiously have the type of free will required by such an egalitarian 
conception as Cohen’s. (ii) Secondly, the egalitarian case has much to 
gain from the clarification of the importance of the free will problem 
for questions of distributive justice (and more specifically, from the 
recognition of the implications of the lack of libertarian free will). 
However, one’s judgment about the possible widespread attractiveness of 
egalitarianism would be very much influenced by one’s position on the 
‘Compatibility Question’ of the free will problem. (iii) Thirdly, the form 
of egalitarianism which will be considered adequate crucially depends 
on the position taken with regard to the free will problem.’ (Smilansky, 
1997: 159-160)
In his reaction, Kang uncovers the Posteriority Thesis as an implicit ele-
ment of Smilansky’s argument. While Kang admits that congruence 
between metaphysical and political theory is a theoretical virtue, he asserts 
that there is no ‘metaphilosophical mandate’ (2003: 108) that dictates (a) 
the necessity of congruence between the two, or (b) that metaphysics takes 
priority in achieving congruence.
Now let us try to define PT. It is important to notice that PT goes 
further than asserting the following:
1. If a political theory presupposes a metaphysical theory, it must be 
a plausible metaphysical theory.
PT claims more than (1) because Smilansky says that political theorists 
who do not supplement their egalitarianism with a metaphysical addendum 
on free will should do so: the ‘adequate form of egalitarianism’ after all cru-
cially depends on one’s position in the free will debate (see citation above). 
In other words, the possibility of putting metaphysical debates aside when 
doing political theory is rejected. Our working definition of PT should 
also incorporate that Smilansky assumes a hierarchy: our political theory 
should be adapted to fit our metaphysics, not the other way around. A 
better definition of PT would therefore be the following:
2. The only viable political theories are those that are grounded in a 
plausible metaphysical theory.
Statement (2) will serve as our definition of PT. 
An important corollary of this definition is that a violation of PT 
is enough reason to dismiss a political theory. Van der Deijl exemplifies 
this in his argument against luck egalitarianism. To show this, let me first 
represent his argument. 
According to Van der Deijl, luck egalitarianism requires ‘substan-
tive responsibility’ in order to distinguish luck from merit. Substantive 
responsibility, a term borrowed from Scanlon (1999), refers to the kind 
of responsibility we carry for autonomous choices (that is, choices that are 
properly our own, rather than ascribed to us by others).1 It can be con-
trasted with attributive responsibility, which regards choices that others 
attribute to us but are not autonomous.
8Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy Manuel Buitenhuis | On Metaphysical Cases against Political Theories
Van der Deijl then asks which of the three positions in the metaphysi-
cal debate on free will entails substantive responsibility. Hard determinism, 
which holds that determinism is true and that, as a consequence, free 
will does not exist, does not entail substantive responsibility because 
hard determinism does not accommodate for individuals as autonomous 
agents: all human actions are the necessary consequence of the preceding 
physical states. The same problem holds for compatibilism. Compatibilists 
hold that some kind of free will can coexist with the truth of the determi-
nist thesis. Since the problem for hard determinists was that determinism 
and substantive responsibility are not compatible, the same problem holds 
for compatibilists. Libertarianism, lastly, seems to do better with respect 
to substantive responsibility. Libertarianism rejects the determinist thesis 
and holds that free will exists, thereby allowing us to see some choices as 
autonomous. Libertarianism can, therefore, be compatible with substan-
tive responsibility. The problem with libertarianism is, however, that it 
is considered an implausible position to begin with, since determinism 
carries too much appeal to be rejected.
Van der Deijl’s conclusion is therefore that either libertarianism is 
true, or substantive responsibility cannot be saved. The latter possibility 
would imply that hard determinists and compatibilists cannot distinguish 
between luck and merit, and luck egalitarianism collapses into outcome 
egalitarianism. 
I submit that Van der Deijl subscribes to PT defined as (2). To qualify, 
Van der Deijl must hold that a political theory is not viable if it is not 
supported by a plausible metaphysical theory. This seems to be the case 
when he says that luck egalitarianism must collapse into outcome egali-
tarianism if one’s metaphysical theory does not offer us tools to separate 
luck from merit, as is the case for hard determinists and compatibilists. 
That compatibilism and hard determinism cannot metaphysically ground 
substantive responsibility should be a sufficient reason for dropping luck 
egalitarianism, unless one is a libertarian. By putting the argument this 
way, Van der Deijl rejects the option of justifying substantive responsibility 
on non-metaphysical grounds. This is evident in his response to Knight. 
Knight (2006) had suggested that one might not need a metaphysical basis 
to support one’s political theory; moral intuitions could perhaps suffice. 
Van der Deijl answers as follows:
‘However, the implicit premise underlying [Knight’s] argument is 
surely false: if our intuition goes against a metaphysical conclusion, 
the metaphysical conclusion is to be rejected. The point of drawing on 
arguments from the free will debate for the distributive justice discussion 
is exactly that it may show us that some of our intuitions may be wrong.’ 
(Van der Deijl, 2013: 28)
Because luck egalitarianism cannot be grounded in hard determinism or 
compatibilism, proponents of those metaphysical views cannot accept 
luck egalitarianism. If moral intuitions disagree with our metaphysical 
conclusions, the intuition should be rejected. Both show that Van der 
Deijl endorses PT: the only viable political theories are those that can be 
grounded in a plausible metaphysical theory. 
3. Unwanted consequences of accepting the Posteriority 
Thesis 
Recall that, according to Kang, there is no ‘metaphilosophical mandate’ 
demanding that metaphysics takes priority over political theory. This 
exposes a vulnerable link in the argumentation of Van der Deijl and 
Smilansky. A political theorist, let’s call him McY might simply decide 
to reject PT, shrugging Van der Deijl’s and Smilansky’s works off. The 
argument might be something like this:
1.  If PT has not been justified, it is arbitrary.
2. If PT is arbitrary, so are arguments that presuppose it.
3. If these arguments against (my preferred flavor of ) egalitarian-
ism are arbitrary, I can offset them by introducing an arbitrary 
criterion of my own (e.g. conformance to moral intuitions, justi-
fication by divine revelation) 
Such an argument would, of course, not be very strong in itself, because 
it merely shifts the burden of proof. That PT is not justified does not 
necessarily mean it is arbitrary, since a justification might still be found 
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(contra 1); furthermore, the lack of explicit argumentation for PT does not 
come close to establishing the contrary (contra 3), regardless of whether 
that contrary is conceived as the independence or precedence of political 
theory. This argument only shows that PT is vulnerable; in order for McY’s 
argument to carry any substantive weight, McY would have to argue that 
his criterion is more attractive than PT, or at least as attractive. 
One way to do that might be to capitalize on the fact that PT may 
have undesirable consequences. 
Firstly, acceptance of PT implies that some debates in political theory 
are impotent until metaphysical issues have been resolved (Fleurbaey, 2001). 
On the topic of luck egalitarianism, Knight mentions the demarcation of 
responsibility as an example of such a debate (2006: 814): accepting PT 
implies that luck egalitarianism can only be applied once consensus has been 
reached on a metaphysical notion of responsibility. Lacking such an answer, 
luck egalitarianism would not be able to progress. More generally, PT seems 
to suggest that we can only engage in political philosophy once we have 
settled all relevant metaphysical debates.
Secondly, PT has some counterintuitive consequences in the case of free 
will. Consider the following exchange: a defender of PT responds to McY’s 
argument by holding that it would be inconsistent to use the concept of ‘free 
will’ in our political philosophy if our favored metaphysical theories suggest 
that free will does not exist.2 McY then brings out the counterintuitiveness of 
PT with a variation: would it not be weird to do political philosophy without 
a notion of free will, since our moral intuitions about free will are so ‘clear 
and distinct’? Why would I a priori reject a feeling that is so prominently 
present in every action I undertake? From this perspective, the problem is 
not that the justification of PT is weak. The problem is, instead, that such 
a weak justification is used to disqualify moral intuitions and beliefs that 
play an important part in our life. Even those who support the determinist 
thesis cannot deny that individuals have the feeling that they are actors that 
make decisions of their own. Much in the same vein, people who believe in 
hard determinism can nevertheless have strong moral intuitions about what 
is fair and what is not. Revising our political theories to comply with PT 
would classify a large class of appealing moral beliefs as irrelevant, because 
they cannot be grounded in our metaphysical theory.
Both consequences come together in a corollary of Van der Deijl’s argu-
ment. If substantive responsibility cannot be saved by hard determinism 
or compatibilism, and the libertarian position is sufficiently implausible to 
not be considered, then adherence to PT requires us to reject all positions 
that presuppose substantive responsibility. This means that individuals can-
not, under any circumstance, be seen as making autonomous choices. The 
consequences of that position are far-reaching. While this is not the place 
to discuss which positions and domains would be affected, the remainder 
of this section will try to give some examples. 
Isaiah Berlin (2000) suggested that rejecting free will would force us to 
change the way we talk about human relations:
“Such expressions as ‘I should not have done x’, ‘How could you have 
chosen x?’ and so on, indeed the entire language of the criticism and 
assessment of one’s own and others’ conduct, would undergo a sharp 
transformation, and the expressions we needed both for descriptive 
and for practical-corrective, deterrent, hortatory purposes (what others 
would be open to a consistent determinist?) would necessarily be vastly 
different from the language which we now use.” (Berlin, 2000: 108)
As a part of this change in vocabulary, accepting hard determinism 
would turn praise and blame to ‘purely corrective or educational instru-
ments, or confine them to aesthetic approval or disapproval’ (Berlin, 
2000: 102). For Berlin, praise and blame do not refer to the kind of 
praise and blame that can be attributed to someone under Scanlon’s 
attributive responsibility, but only to praise and blame for autonomous 
actions: one is praised for the autonomous decision to save a drowning 
child, and one is blamed for the autonomous decision to steal. This 
kind of praise and blame cannot exist for hard determinists, since every 
action that is potentially praise- or blameworthy necessarily follows from 
preceding physical states. The only sense in which we can still speak 
of praise and blame is, according to Berlin, aesthetic. This implies that 
we can praise someone’s bravery only in the same way that we praise 
someone’s beautiful eyes. Both are, after all, the necessary consequence 
of physical causes; or conversely, neither follows from the autonomous 
choices of the individual.
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What we have lost along the way is a moral perspective on praise and 
blame. As the citation foreshadowed, the loss of this kind of moral praise 
and blame seems to render statements and questions like ‘I should not 
have done x’ or ‘How could you have chosen x?’ empty. If I cannot make 
autonomous choices, my choice at moment t was ‘necessary’ in the same 
way that my regret at moment t+1 is; similarly, it seems to make little 
sense to blame you for choosing x if it was not your autonomous choice 
to begin with. 
This point has a practical bearing on our justice system. Courts of 
law are often confronted with questions of responsibility. Is someone 
who committed a murder while sleepwalking responsible for his crime, 
even though he was not conscious (Lamme, 2011)? Is kleptomania an 
adequate excuse for theft, or should compulsion not count as a mitigating 
circumstance? If we reject autonomous choices on a metaphysical level 
and insist, through PT, that our political theory conforms to our rejection 
of the possibility of autonomous decision making, then our current way 
of treating these cases needs to be revised.
These examples offer insight into some of the consequences that the 
rejection of substantive responsibility may have. If we apply PT con-
sistently, much more is lost than particular forms of egalitarianism. Of 
course, a defender of PT might decide to bite the bullet here. It just 
seems like quite a big bullet to bite, especially given the fact that PT is 
not independently justified. 
4. John Rawls: the Plausibility of Political Theory without 
the Posteriority Thesis
This section shows that it is possible to do political philosophy without 
the Posteriority Thesis and that, consequently, metaphysical theory is 
not the only legitimate starting point of political philosophy. The lead 
is taken from Kang (2003). Arguing against Smilansky, Kang held that 
Rawls has shown how contradicting social values, such as equality and 
inequality, can be mediated by non-metaphysical criteria. While Rawls 
defends a limited amount of inequality, he does not do so on metaphy-
sical grounds; that is, because a limited amount of inequality is entailed 
by a metaphysical theory about the nature of human beings. Instead, 
he refers to a category of principles Kang calls ‘rational precepts’ (2003: 
117). Examples of such rational precepts are economic analyses and 
instruments such as Pareto efficiency. Some limited level of inequality 
can be defended, for example, because it makes everyone better off eco-
nomically. In deciding what level of inequality to allow in society, Rawls 
delegates decision-making to procedures on which society has, implicitly, 
agreed – not to metaphysical considerations.
Kang’s point is that there is more leeway between metaphysics and 
political theory than Smilansky is willing to admit. However, if we 
decide to take our cue from Rawls, there might be more lessons to be 
learned.
In Justice as Fairness (2001), Rawls emphasizes that his earlier works 
were often misinterpreted as built on the foundation of a particular set of 
philosophical assumptions about the nature of human beings. He argues 
that his views are to be interpreted as a political, rather than a philosophi-
cal theory. 
‘Justice as fairness hopes to put aside long-standing religious and 
philosophical controversies and to avoid relying on any particular 
comprehensive view. It uses a different idea, that of public justification, 
and seeks to moderate divisive political conflicts and to specify the 
conditions of fair social cooperation between citizens.’ (Rawls, 2001: 
29)
Rawls’ starting point differs from that of Smilansky and Van der Deijl. 
Smilansky and Van der Deijl inquire what political theory can be jus-
tified on the basis of a particular metaphysical theory; Rawls accepts 
a pluralist society, in which people have different norms, values and 
beliefs about the world, as his starting point. Rawls’ outset is to build 
a bridge between these different moral, religious and philosophical 
doctrines, rather than to convince anyone that a particular doctrine 
is wrong and should be exchanged for a different one. The ‘rational 
precepts’ that Kang refers to are one of the building blocks with which 
the bridge is built. 
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It is also interesting to note that Rawls explicitly states that the 
relevance of free will to political theory is to be drawn from its implicit 
use in the public sphere. If the metaphysical debate on free will has any 
importance for political theory, it is relevant because it influences the 
political views of individuals. Rawls thereby avoids having to deal with 
difficulties of the kind raised by Van der Deijl and Smilansky.
Richard Rorty’s discussion of Rawls’ views on the relation between 
politics and philosophy helps to bring out that Rawls’ approach to 
political theory can coexist with hard determinism, compatibilism and 
libertarianism alike. 
According to Rorty, Rawls’ ability to cater to a pluralist society is 
made possible by the separation of metaphysics and political theory.  For 
Rawls, questions regarding human nature are not relevant when we talk 
about the organization of our society.  Rorty adds a historical twist to 
Rawls, suggesting that the beliefs and values that Rawls calls ‘meanings 
embedded in political culture’ can be seen in a historical and sociological 
perspective (Rorty, 2008: 181).
This emphasis on the historical contingency of the beliefs and values 
employed by Rawls should chime well with those who reject free will. 
Rorty points out, after all, that Rawls does not presuppose that these 
beliefs and values are the result of autonomous individual agency. He only 
requires them to be there. In the same vein, this emphasis on the historical 
contingency of beliefs and values should not prevent a Rawlsian frame-
work from being accepted by compatibilists and libertarians. 
The key point is that Rawls’ view does not depend on a conception of 
individuals as either autonomous or not autonomous.  This allows Rawls 
to be genuinely indifferent towards the metaphysical issue of free will: its 
outcomes do not matter to his method, because his starting point consists 
of moral dispositions as experienced, not as caused.  This point is important, 
because it shows that Rawls’ theory does not disagree with any specific 
position in the metaphysical debate – Rawls simply does not need them. 
It is perhaps worthwhile to make a short detour to point out that I 
stray from Kang’s own classification of Rawls when I say that he rejects 
PT. According to Kang, Rawls conforms to PT, but I think this is because 
Kang applies his own criteria inconsistently. When discussing Rawls, Kang 
holds that Rawls accepts PT but deviates from it when there are rational pre-
cepts that justify doing so. Accordingly, Rawls deviates from the principle of 
income equality that follows from his hard determinist intuitions because 
rational precepts dictate that allowing limited inequality makes everyone 
better off.  At the same time, PT was coined by Kang to represent the view 
that one’s political theory should conform to one’s metaphysical theory. 
In that case stating that Rawls deviates from PT when there are rational 
precepts that justify it seems to be contradictory. The rational precept that 
Kang uses to illustrate his point is, after all, an ethical statement: inequality 
is asserted to make ‘everyone better off’. I contend Kang presents Rawls as 
deviating from the thesis that metaphysics precedes ethics on ethical grounds, 
which renders the thesis vacuous. PT would then hold that metaphysics 
precedes ethics unless there are ethical reasons to do otherwise.
That Kang’s ascription of PT to Rawls renders the term vacuous can 
also be seen in a different way, since Kang offers no directions as to what 
can pass for a ‘rational precept’. Kang admits that this question still needs 
to be answered, but might underestimate the consequence that it has for 
his categorization of Rawls. If the answer to the question is only a light 
constraint, then PT is more often ignored than upheld – and vice versa if 
the constraint is more severe. The only interpretation of PT that would be 
compatible with Rawls is a vacuous one, and consequently I interpret Rawls 
as rejecting PT.
It is now time to take all this back to the question of this paper. 
There are two points to be made here. Firstly, on a more general note, the 
example of Rawls shows that it is possible to justify a political theory on 
non-metaphysical grounds – in other words, that it is possible to engage in 
political theory if we do not uphold PT. In the case of Rawls, this is done 
by taking moral beliefs and dispositions as our starting point.  
Secondly, relating specifically to Smilansky and Van der Deijl, the 
plausibility of a non-metaphysical justification of political theory calls into 
question whether they were right to dismiss a political theory that could 
not be justified metaphysically. It is, after all, possible to justify a political 
theory without any reference to metaphysical theories. 
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5. Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to evaluate the Posteriority Thesis, as 
the claim that metaphysical theories take precedence over political 
theories so that only political theories that conform with a plausible 
metaphysical theory are admissible. PT is an implicit premise in Smilanksy 
and Van der Deijl’s arguments. In this paper I argued that it is questionable 
whether political theories can be decisively dismissed by such arguments.
The argument proceeded in two steps. Firstly, it was shown 
that PT itself is currently not supported by an independent argu-
ment, and that it has some significant undesirable consequences. 
Secondly, it was shown that political theories can be legitimately 
supported by non-metaphysical starting points. The example of Rawls 
illustrates that consistency with a particular metaphysical theory is not 
necessarily an attribute of a political theory, weakening the case for reject-
ing political theories on exclusively metaphysical grounds. 
While the arguments of Smilansky and Van der Deijl hold when 
assuming that one’s political theory must conform to one’s metaphysical 
theory, this paper has tried to build credibility for the rejection of that 
assumption. The main aim of this paper would therefore be achieved 
when you have been convinced that the Posteriority Thesis is not a trivial 
assumption. Not only are its consequences counterintuitive and 
possibly paralyzing for political theory, but unquestioned acceptance of the 
Posteriority Thesis also risks closing us off from alternative approaches. 
There is more between heaven and earth than metaphysics. 
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Notes
1. There is a lot more to be said on this subject, but this definition should suffice for 
present purposes.
2. Van der Deijl exemplifies this when he holds that ‘The point of drawing on argu-
ments from the free will debate for the distributive justice discussion is exactly that 
it may show us that some of our intuitions may be wrong.’ (Van der Deijl 2013: 28).
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